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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL BOURNE RASBAND,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO:

CAROL T. RASBAND,

87-0081-CA

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Judgment of the District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah,
Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The

parties

to

this

action were

married

August 20,

1957, in Salt Lake City, Utah, (Tr. 19, Tr. 220).

Four (4)

children were born as issue of the marriage with all

f them

having obtained the age of 18 and having graduated fr^m high
school (R. 86).
The Appellant has worked several jobs in recent years,
although admittedly only part-time (Tr. 221), but is capable
of typing 77 words a minute with accuracy of three

(3) or

four (4) mistakes, and is capable of using a dictaphone (Tr.
261).

Since January, 1986, Appellant has not applied for

any full-time work, but in response to whether or not she
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was willing to go to work, indicated that she would work
because she wanted to (Tr. 262). Appellant indicated she
was willing to go to work once her son, Brian, was in
college in the fall. (Tr. 262) .

The Court made provisions

accordingly for Respondent to pay to Appellant the sum of
$800.00 per month alimony for a period of one

(1) year,

thereafter the sum of $700.00 for two (2) years, $500.00 for
two (2) years, and $350.00 for an additional five (5) years,
after which it would be reduced to $1.00 per year, allowing
for payment of alimony over a ten (10) year period WITH THE
OPTION TO INCREASE THE ALIMONY IF NECESSARY (R. 105). The
Appellant indicated that she could not seek employment as
she had transportation problems and could not read for an
extended period as her glasses were not the correct prescription, and knew that she would need new glasses before
obtaining employment (Tr. 220 - 222, 228 - 229). The Court
provided proper transportation i

;the Appellant by awarding

to her the Pontiac automobile and ordering Plaintiff to have
the transmission repaired

(Tr. 102) .

In regards to the

prescription for new glasses, Plaintiff was awarded alimony
on-going for at least a ten (10) year period at reducing
amounts (Tr. 105) .
The Court determined

that Appellant

"is capable of

meaningful employment in the future." (R. 73, 88).
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From 1977 through 1984 the Respondent was employed as a
manager of an insurance agency by State Farm Insurance (Tr.
34) , and in January of 1985 he became an agent himself by
assuming a retiring agent's accounts
Respondent

changed

jobs

due

to

(Tr. 33, 34).

a nervous

breakdown

The
in

December of 1983, and stress in his position as an agency
manager and has health problems resulting from the breakdown
consisting of chronic asthma and the need for medication
three (3) or four (4) times a day and an inhaler every three
(3) or four

(4) hours, including slightly elevated blood

pressure (Tr. 41, 42).

In his new occupation, Respondent

was grossing approximately

$7,000.00 per month

from his

business and the Court found that he was earning $3,809.00
per month as a net business income (R. 73, 88).
Throughout the trial, Appellant and Respondent testified as to miscellaneous items of property and the Court
ultimately

divided both the real and personal property of

the marital estate in an equitable fashion (R. 102, 103,
104) .

The Appellant was awarded the home of the parties

subject to the existing mortgage, allowing the Respondent
from the equity therein $9,992.00 to reimburse him for the
payment of the family debts plus $5,400.00 to equalize the
value of the personal property received by the respective
parties with the balance of the equity to be divided equally
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between the parties after equally sharing the cost of an
appraisal (R. 104).
The attorney for the Appellant stated that his total
charges for attorney's fees, including the trial and time
thereafter to finish, amounted to $7,970.00 due to two (2)
"difficult" areas that had to be taken including that of the
disability of the child and the business expenses of the
Respondent

(Tr. 291) .

The trial Judge specifically found

that the case before it was not a difficult one from a law
or fact standpoint and one not requiring extensive discovSuch a reasonable attorneyfs fee for the Defendant

ery.

would be $3,500.00, $2,500.00 of which she had paid, thereby
ordering Respondent to pay an additional $1,000.00 for the
use and benefit of Appellant's attorney. (R. 106)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Appellant Court in reviewing matters in equity

and more specifically, in a divorce action, will refrain
from disturbing the findings of the Trial Court unless a
clear abuse of discretion is shown.
2.

The Trial Court

in a

sense did

award

to the

Appellant permanent alimony, but in a decreasing manner,
taking

into

consideration

and

balancing

condition and needs of the spouse claiming
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the

financial

support, the

ability

of

that

spouse

to provide

sufficient

income

for

herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to provide
the support such that there was not an abuse of discretion
by the Trial Court in awarding alimony as it did.
3.

The Trial Court did equitably divide the property

of the parties, both real and personal, in light of the
needs and circumstances of the parties such that the Trial
Court did not abuse its discretion in the division.
4.

The Trial Court found that Appellant incurred a

reasonable attorney's fee of $3,500.00

in litigating

this

action and properly awarded Appellant, after having found
that $2,500.00 had been paid to her attorney, the remaining
balance of $1,000.00, meeting the case law and requirements
of Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3.
5.

Appellant's

appeal

is

either

frivolous

or

for

delay entitling Respondent to an award of damages, including
any reasonable attorney's fee should the Respondent prevail
pursuant

to Rule

33 of

Appeals,

and

addition,

in

the

Rules of
if

the

Utah

Respondent's

Court

of

judgment

is

affirmed, costs to be taxed against the Appellant unless
otherwise awarded pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS
OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE IS A
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A DIVORCE
CASE.
The
recently

standard

for

reviewing

by

the Utah

considered

matters
Supreme

in

equity

was

in J

& M

Court

Construction, Inc., v. Southam, 38 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah
1986) , wherein the Court held as follows:
In reviewing matters in equity, this
Court will reverse the Trial Court only
when the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings below. Although we
may review that evidence, we are particularly mindful of the advantaged position of the Trial Court to hear, weigh,
and
evaluate
the testimony
of
the
parties.
(Cite omitted)
Where
the
evidence may be in conflict, this Court
will not upset the findings below unless
the evidence so clearly preponderates
against them that this Court is convinced that a manifest injustice has
been done...
The Court of Appeals of Utah in a recent decision of
Boyle

v.

Boyle,

735

P.2d

669

(Utah App.

1987)

follows:
This Court will refrain from disturbing
findings of the Trial Court in a divorce
action unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. (Cite omitted)
The
Trial Court is clearly in the best
position to weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual
conclusions...
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held

as

POINT II.

THE APPELLANT
WAS
PROPERLY
AWARDED
PERMANENT DECREASING ALIMONY AS WITHIN
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT.
The Appellant cites the Honorable Court to their recent
decision of Eames v. Eames, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 49,

P.2d

(Utah 1987) , wherein this Honorable Court cited a recent
Utah Supreme Court opinion concerning alimony stating that
the

Trial

Court

must

consider

the

following

factors

in

awarding alimony:
(1)

The financial condition and needs of the spouse

claiming support,
(2)

The ability of that spouse to provide sufficient

income for him or herself, and
(3)

The ability of the responding

spouse to provide

the support.
Ean
carefully

v. Eames, supra, held that the Trial Court had
and

properly

considered

the

above

factors

and

found there was no abuse of discretion such that the award
of alimony would not be disturbed.

That case specifically

dealt with a couple not unlike the parties in the immediate
case that had been married for a period of 30 years.

They

had three (3) children born to the union, and at the time of
trial their youngest child was 18 years old and resided with
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Plaintiff in the family home, such as Brian is residing with
the Appellant in the family home.

In the Eames case the

Plaintiff, who was the Respondent, was awarded alimony in
the amount of $450.00 per month as long as the youngest
child successfully pursued a full-time college education,
lived in the home, remained single or reached the age of 21
years, then alimony was reduced to $300.00 per month and
would remain so until Plaintiff reached the age of 65 years
at which time the alimony would terminate.

The Trial Court

found that Plaintiff was employed as a department manager
and clerk for a large store and her gross income was approximately $10,000.00 per year and that she had been employed
during most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained type
positions while the Appellant/Defendant was a manufacturing
engineer with a gross income of approximately $34,000.00 per
year.

The Eames case did fail to provide the present age of

the Plaintiff that was receiving alimony.
In the immediate case at hand, the lower Court did
award to the Appellant alimony of $800.00 per month for a
period of one (1) year, and $700.00 per month for two (2)
years, and $500.00 per month for two (2) years, and $350.00
per month for five

(5) years, and then $1.00 per year,

allowing Appellant the opportunity, should occasion arise,
for her to petition the Court to increase payment of alimony
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should

there

necessitating

be
her

a

substantial

increase

in

change
alimony.

in

circumstances

This

in effect

awarded to the Appellant an entitlement of alimony for the
rest of her life, or until such time as terminated by law.
The trial Judge took into consideration the three (3)
factors alluded to in ,Paffel v. Paffelf 732 P. 2d 96, 100
(Utah

1986), by

considering

and weighing

the

financial

condition and needs of the spouse, or the Appellant herein,
by considering the testimony offered regarding the ability
of the Appellant to provide sufficient income for herself,
and by balancing that against the ability of the Respondent
to provide the support.
Ample testimony was offered by both parties that the
Appellant was capable of working and in fact had worked
several part-time jobs during the marriage of the parties.
Additionally, the Appellant testified that she was capable
of typing 77 words a minute, was an excellent typist, was
capable of working with dictaphone machinery and on many
occasions
affairs.

had

assisted

the

Respondent

in

his

business

The only "disabilities" which Appellant testified

to were her failure to have worked full-time, difficulties
in transportation, and with her glasses.

The District Court

in its findings awarded to the Appellant the Pontiac automobile with the order that Respondent repair the transmission
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of that automobile to resolve her difficulties in transpor
tation, and

did

award

a

substantial

amount

of

alimony

initially to the Appellant which would allow her to purchase
proper

glasses

through

a

new

prescription.

Otherwise

Appellant appeared as found by the District Court to be
"capable of meaningful employment in the future".
The Respondent testified and presented Exhibits, and
the Court found that the Respondent's income was approximately $3,800.00 per month before taxes, and also found that
the

needs

of

the Appellant

$1,400.00 per month.

were

between

$1,250.00

and

The Court having established the needs

of the Appellant and that she was fully capable of meaningful employment based on the testimony of the parties, did
then divide the property of the parties and finally and
ultimately did award to the Appellant the alimony now sought
to be overturned.
Appellant refers the Court to the
Case of Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d

379

ah Supreme Court
(Utah 1983), by

implying that the District Court has failed to grant a sum
consistent with the life-style of the parties and it has
thereby violated the direction of the Supreme Court in this
case.

The Defendant and Plaintiff in this case were married

for a period of 30 years and Defendant was awarded alimony
in the amount of $100.00 a month which was found to be an
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abuse of the discretion of the Trial Court.

This case can

be clearly distinguished from the immediate case at hand in
that the trial Judge in Higley failed to make any findings
as to the Defendant's ability to work, especially in light
of

the Defendant's

health

problems which would

restrict

her employability.

physical

health

having

greatly

The

Defendant

was

in poor

an

operation

for

pyloric

had

gastrectomy and hiatal hernia which necessitated the removal
of three-fourths of her stomach.

Defendant therein had also

had a hysterectomy due to hemorrhaging and potassium shock/
and finally underwent an operation to remove blockage and
rebuild the outlet to her stomach.

Eighteen days later

another operation for intestinal blockage was performed and
at the time of the trial she was in need of further surgery
for blockage to rebuild the outlet to her stomach.

In the

immediate case at hand, the trial Judge did find specifically that the

ppellant was able to work and there was no real

evidence or a finding that Appellant's ability to work was
hindered by any health problems.
The Appellant refers the Honorable Court to Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), indicating that the Trial
Court erred in awarding declining alimony in the face of a
long-term marriage where the wife had no work or education
producing an expectancy of self-support.
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That case dealt

specifically with the three (3) standards previously mentioned as guidelines for determining alimony and found that
the Court had failed to apply those guidelines.
can be distinguished

on the ability

This case

of the party

paying

support wherein the Court has as follows:
The apportionment of income between
personal and business uses is quite
properly a matter left to the discretion
of the husband as owner of the pharmacy
and gift shop. However, how he chooses
to allocate that profit is not binding
on the Court in determining his ability
to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The
full profit produced by the business,
adjusted by the Court to take into
account legitimate reasonable needs of
the business for additional capital,
should have been used as the basis for
assessing
the
husband's
ability
to
provide for his spouse. In making this
analysis, the Trial Court should not
permit all claims of need for capital on
the part of the business to take precedence over the support needs of the
wife.
If these capital needs are a
result of discretionary decisions of the
husband
to expand
and
improve
the
business, rather than to maintain it in
its present condition, then to permit
him to divert income into the business
at the expense
of his
ex-spouse f s
support needs would be to permit him to
enrich himself at her expense.
In the immediate case at hand, the Trial Court specifically found that the Respondent had a pre-tax income of
$3,800.00 which was used for living expenses such that the
Respondent was

not using

sums to expand
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and

improve

his

business, but was maintaining the business in its present
condition such that the Trial Court did take into consideration in the immediate case at hand all three (3) guidelines in making a determination as to declining alimony.
In the case of Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d

564 (Utah

1984), the Court specifically found as follows:
While the alimony award was far below
the total amount required to maintain
the wife at the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage, it is
reasonable in light of the limited
family resources available to fulfill
her needs. Thus, we find no abuse of
discretion...
The Court did find,
however, that at termination of alimony
after two (2) years was a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.
In the immediate case at hand, the trial Judge did not
grant two (2) years of alimony with termination thereafter,
but granted decreasing alimony over a period of ten (10)
years with a provision of alimony to continue at the rate of
$1.00 per year allowing the wife to "petition the

irt for

modification of the amount of alimony under the court's
continuing jurisdiction".

Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567

(Utah 1985), distinguishing the immediate case from Olson v.
Olson.
The instant case does fall clearly within the articulated guidelines for alimony as awarded by the trial Judge
established by the Utah Supreme Court and applied by this
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Court in Eames v. Eames, supra.

The trial Judge did consid-

er those three (3) guidelines and determined that the needs
of the receiving spouse coupled with her apparent ability to
work and the ability of the paying spouse to pay entitled
Appellant to a decreasing award of alimony with a provision
after ten (10) years which would allow her to increase said
alimony

should

circumstances

there

which

be

a

in effect

substantial
awarded

change

permanent

in

alimony

unless terminated by law.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID EQUITABLY DIVIDE THE
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES, BOTH REAL AND
PERSONAL•
As the Appellant points out in her Brief, the Utah
Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Alexander, 56 Utah Adv.
Rep. 31 (Utah 1987) :
As loi as a property division is made
within -che standards set by this Court,
we will not disturb the trial Judge's
decision. (Cites omitted)
This Court
endows the court's adjustment of the
financial interests of the parties with
a presumption of validity and does not
review their values absent a clear abuse
of discretion...
We do not lightly
disturb property divisions made by the
Trial Court and uphold its decision
except where to do so would work a
manifest injustice or inequity.
The Appellant would have this Honorable Court believe
that a manifest injustice or an inequity has been worked by
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the trial Judge when the home was awarded to the Defendant
as she requested subject to the existing mortgage thereof.
Testimony was offered by the Respondent and the Appellant
with varying figures as to the actual value of the home, but
the value of the subject property was between $100,000.00 to
$125,000.00, with a lien thereon of $52,000.00, leaving a
substantial

equity

which

is

to

be

divided

between

the

parties upon the occurring of one of several events.
Appellant upon cross-examination was questioned as to
her use of such a large home when only herself and Shelley
were present to which the Appellant responded she would not
need a home that large but would proably rent the home out
to help her with an income.
The Appellant places a great deal of emphasis on the
fact that she has an adult child living with her which is an
increased burden when at the same time Appellant has been
awarded the amount of $250.00 for the adult child to assist
her in this additional expense which is in addition to the
on-going alimony.
The Trial Court did carry out the primary mandate of
MacDonald

v.

MacDonald,

1236

P.2d

1066

(Utah

1951),

in

making a division of the property and income so that the
parties could readjust their lives to their new situation as
well

as

possible.

The

Appellant

-15-

was

awarded

the

home

subject to a lien in the Respondent, allowing Appellant time
to adjust to the new situation.
In Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 572 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court found that the Trial Court did award to the
Defendant 35% of the marital property and 65% of the marital
property to the Plaintiff when taking into consideration the
obligation of Plaintiff to pay the marital debts.

The Court

found this division to be equitable in that the Defendant
was awarded the income producing assets of the marriage, he
had two

(2) college degrees, several years experience in

operating his business and a reasonably assured future of
earning some profits from his business activities.

This

case is distinguished from the immediate case in that the
Plaintiff, who had no college education, was unemployed at
the time of trial, was not awarded alimony and was only
given $135.00 per month for each child's support, where in
the immediate case at hand the Appellant has been awardea
substantial decreasing alimony without a termination date
and $250.00 per month for an adult child's support.
In the case of Turner v. Turner, 649 P. 2d 6 (Utah
1982) , the Supreme Court held as follows:
There is no fixed rule or formula for
the distribution of a marital estate...
In Henderson v. Henderson, 576 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1978),
the Utah Supreme Court

felt that with
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"the concomitant

obligation to solely provide for the children" supported an
approximate two-thirds, one-third division of the property
and persuaded

the Court

as being

a reasonable

and not

inequitable solution to a most difficult domestic problem.
In Henderson the mother had basically abandoned or neglected
her home and family in favor of the pursuit of employment, a
Master's Degree, and a career which had ultimately led her
to a responsible and highly enumerative position in the
field of nursing and also ultimately resulted in the award
of the five (5) children of the marriage to the Plaintiff,
Plaintiff having, as stated above, the sole obligation to
provide for the children.

In the immediate case at hand,

the Appellant has a responsibility of an adult child for
which the Respondent has been ordered to pay the sum of
$250.00 per month as and for child support, clearly distinguishing

the

instant

case

from Henderson

equitable division in this cast

such

that an

ould be an equal division

of marital property.
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d

1380

(Utah 1980), it is

proposed by Appellant to indicate the equity of an award of
two-thirds of family property to the wife and one-third to
the husband, or 55% to the wife and 45% to the husband.

In

Kerr, it was undisputed that the Plaintiff had contributed
$10,000.00 from her own separate funds to completely furnish

-17-

the first home of the parties, and when that home was sold
and their current home was purchased, many of those furnishings were moved to and were still in the new residence.

It

was further found that the Plaintiff had contributed another
$5,000.00 of her own funds in 1967 to retire the mortgage on
the

residence.

undisputed
cretion
property

The

Court

found

that

in

view

of

these

facts, the Trial Court did not abuse its dis-

in

awarding

the

to the Plaintiff

greater

portion

of

the

marital

than to the Defendant.

In the

instant case, the facts are quite to the contrary.

Ample

evidence is given of an inheritance received by the Respondent which was co-mingled with family funds to pay bills and
other miscellaneous items, yet the Court found it equitable
to make an equal division of the marital assets.

The Trial

Court finding of fact number 10 in Yelderman v. Yelderman,
669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983), states:
Some of the objectives of the Court in
arriving at a fair division are to
accomplish a division of the properties
as nearly as practicable on an equal
basis based upon the court's determination of fair market values in taking
into account the assumption of marital
debt...
The Court in that case in trying to achieve its objective of as nearly

as practicable

a division on an equal

basis, ended up with a division of 56% and 44%, indicating,
not as the Appellant proposes, that the Court was awarding
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more to one party than to the other, but quite to the
contrary, that the Court was trying to effect as equal a
basis as possible based on the fair market values and taking
into account the assumption of marital debt which is exactly
what the trial Judge has done in the instant case.
Respondent fully understands that the Court is entitled
to make an equitable distribution of the marital assets of
the

parties,

taking

into

consideration

the

15

factors

involved in the case of MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, which
could result in an unequal division, but as the Appellant
admits, each of the cases which allowed an unequal but
equitable division as noted by Respondent involved specific
and distinguishing facts, allowing an unequal division of
marital assets to be considered an equitable one, all of
which are distinguishable from the instant case.

In this

case the trial Judge took into consideration the 15 factors
after ample and extensive testimony and effected a division
of the property which was equal and equitable with varying
factors.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID AWARD REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT.
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The Trial Court ruled that this was a simple case which
should

have

further

been

prepared

determined

that

and

tried

since

the

for

$3,500.00.

Appellant

had

It

raised

$2,500.00 of this amount, only $1,000.00 needed to be paid
by the Respondent.

The Utah Supreme Court did rule in Kerr

v. Kerr,

1380

divorce
pursuant

610 P.2d

proceeding

(Utah

1980),

is empowered

to Utah Code Annotated

that

to award

a Court

in a

attorney's

fees

§ 30-3-3, and

that

that

award and the amount rests primarily with the sound discretion of the Trial Court based on evidence of need and
reasonableness as with an award of alimony.
As

stated

in Appellant's Brief, the Court does take

into consideration

in considering a requested award, take

into consideration the attorney's background of learning and
experience, his ability, his integrity, his dedication to
the

causes

with

which

he

identifies

himself,

reputation, the nature and importance oi
amount of money or value of property

also

his

le matter, and the
involved.

recent case of Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d

862

The more

(Utah 1984),

reaffirmed this section of the Utah Code by indicating that
in divorce cases an award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence which shows that the requested award is
reasonable and which establishes the financial need of the
party

requesting

the

award;
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relevant

factors

of

reasonableness include the necessity of the number of hours
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light
of the difficulty of the case, and the result accomplished,
and

the rates

community.

commonly

The

even

charged
more

for divorce

recent

case

cases

of

in the

Cabrera

v.

Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985), held:
Reasonable
attorney's
fees
are
not
measured by what an attorney actually
bills, nor is the number of hours spent
on the case determinative in computing
fees. In determining the reasonableness
of attorney's fees, the trial Judge may
take into account the provision in the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
which specifies the elements that should
be considered
in setting reasonable
attorney's fees.
The Utah Code of
Professional Responsibility E.R. 2-106.
The Court may consider, among other
factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in
presenting the case, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the
locality
for
similar
services, the
amour. involved in the case and the
resu
obtained, and the expertise and
experience of the attorneys involved.
In the immediate case at hand, counsel for the Appellant did testify that he specializes in his practice in the
area of family law, and testified that he felt that there
were particular problems faced in this case such as hidden
income, permanent dependence of a child and the need for
permanent

alimony.

He

further

testified

that

while

his

billing rate was above the going rate in the community, he
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thought the charges were reasonable because of the particular

problems

presented

foregoing

sentence.

testified

that

he

by

The
had

the

case

attorney

utilized

as presented

for

the

in

the Appellant

services

of

a

the
also

legal

assistant to reduce the charges incurred and believes that
those too were reasonable and should be awarded.
In regards to the award of services of a legal assistant, the Appellant
Continental

and

Townhouses

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).

her

East

attorney
v.

cite

Brockbank,

the
733

Court
P. 2d

to
1120

In this case the Court of Appeals of

Arizona in interpreting a statute of Arizona held that the
trial Judge is not required to, but may consider, the value
of

services

rendered

in a case by

legal assistants, law

clerks and paralegals, applying the same standards as are
used in evaluating

lawyers time.

This is only persuasive

authority and is not binding as precedence on this Court,
nor was it alluded to in the Trial Court.

The trial Judge

specifically stated on the record in response to Appellant's
attorney's statement "Those were matters that were handled
by me and that I bring her to trial to assist her in witness
management and exhibit management as follows:

We have a

bailiff that primarily handles both of those things and so
if you want to bring one that's, you are welcome to do that,
Mr. Dolowitz, but I can tell you right off that it's not the
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Court's intent to allow you to receive credit for that and
the computation of legal fees in these matters." (Tr. 293)
The trial Judge found after taking this matter under
advisement

and

based

on

the

specific

testimony

of

the

Appellant's attorney in regards to the factors to be considered in Kerr v. Kerr, supra, Beals v. Beals, supra, and
Cabrera, that the case before the Court was not a difficult
one from the law or fact standpoint, and one not requiring
an extensive discovery such that a reasonable attorney's fee
for the Defendant would be $3,500.00, $2,500.00 of which she
had

paid

from

monies

marriage,

leaving

Defendant

from Plaintiff

attorney, which
Court

after

a

acquired
balance

owing

the

of

course

of

the

$1,000.00

to

the

for the use and benefit of her

is clearly

reviewing

during

the

within

the

testimony

discretion
of

the

of

the

Appellant's

attorney as to the reasonableness of the fee, those factors
involved therein and the needs of the Appellant.

POINT V
IF THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS
OR FOR DELAY, RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
DAMAGES INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S
FEES, AND IF THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED,
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AGAINST
THE APPELLANT.

-23-

The
entitle

Rules
damages

of

the

for

Utah

delay

Court
or

of

Appeals,

frivolous

appeal

Rule
state

33,
as

follows:
(a) Damages for delay or
frivolous
appeal. If the Court determines that a
motion made or an appeal taken under
these Rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and
single
or
double
costs,
including
reasonable
attorney's
fees,
to
the
prevailing party.
Should the Court determine that the Appellant's appeal is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages
and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees, to the Respondent.
Rule

34 of

the

Rules

of

the Utah Court

of Appeals

entitle award of costs, states:
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against
the Appellant unless otherwise agreed by
the parties or ordered by the Court; if
a judgment order is affirmed, costs
shall be taxed against the Appellant
unless otherwise ordered.
Should Appellant's appeal be dismissed or Respondent's
judgment affirmed costs should be taxed against the Appellant unless otherwise ordered.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellant

seeks

reversal

of

the

Trial

Court's

Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and ultimate Decree of
Divorce by requesting that this Court set aside a decreasing
award

of alimony, by

awarding

the marital home to the

Appellant and by awarding the attorney's fees requested by
the Appellant's attorney.

All three of these matters are

within the discretion of the trial Judge and can only be
reviewed and overturned or set aside by by this Court if
there has been a clear abuse of the trial Judge's discretion.

A review of the Case Law presented by Appellant

and as distinguished by the Respondent indicates that the
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in any of the three
(3) matters, but did take under consideration the three (3)
guidelines in awarding decreasing alimony, the guidelines in
awarding an equitable and equal division of the marital
property,

and

the

guidelines

in

awarding

a

reasonable

attorney's fee of $3,500.00, $2,500.00 of which had already
been paid as found by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Trial Court having complied with the
mandates of this Court, Respondent requests that the Appellant's appeal be dismissed, nothing awarded thereby, and
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that the Respondent be awarded costs and his attorney's fees
in responding to this action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Sh?

day of July, 1987.
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